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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petition for Review was originally filed in the
Utah Supreme Court under number 920305.

The case was transferred

to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-2-2(4)
(1992).

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah

Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Where title passes prior to the time a modular housing
unit is attached to real property does it constitute a sale of
tangible personal property?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l to -22 (1987), applies to this appeal.

The

proper standard of review under UAPA is "abuse of discretion"
found in § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah 1992).

Thus, the Tax

Commission's decision should be upheld unless the Tax Commission
has abused its discretion.

See also Morton Int'l, Inc. v.

Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587
(Utah 1991) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
STATUTES:
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1987):
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the
amount paid or charged for the following:
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property
made within the state; . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13) (1987):
(a) "Tangible personal property" means:

(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and
commodities;
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and
substances which are dealt in or capable of being
possessed or exchanged;
• • • •

(iv) all other physically existing articles or
things, including property severed from real
estate,
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not include:
(i) real estate or any interest therein or
improvements thereon; • • . .
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(1)(a) (1987):
Each vendor is responsible for the collection of the
sales or use tax imposed under this chapter.
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES:
Utah Admin. R. R865-26S-1 (1987-1988):
A. "Tangible personal property" means all goods, wares,
merchandise, produce, and commodities, all tangible or
corporeal things and substances which are dealt in or
capable of being possessed or exchanged. It does not
include real estate or any interest therein, . . . .
Tangible personal property includes all other
physically existing articles or things, including
property severed from real estate.
Utah Admin. R. R865-2S-1 (1987-1988):
A. The sales and use taxes are transaction taxes
imposed upon certain retail sales and leases of
tangible personal property, as well as upon certain
services.
B. The tax is not upon the articles sold or furnished,
but upon the transaction, and the purchaser is the
actual taxpayer. The vendor is charged with the duty
of collecting the tax from the purchaser and of paying
the tax to the state.
Utah Admin. R. R865-58S-1 (1987-1988):
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real property
contractors and repairmen of real property is generally
subject to tax.
1. The person who converts the personal property into
real property is the consumer of the personal property
-2-

since he is the last one to own it as personal
property.
2. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or
repair real property; . . . .
3. The sale of real property is not subject to the tax
nor is the labor performed on real property. For
example, the sale of a completed home or building is
not subject to the tax, but sales of materials and
supplies to contractors and subcontractors are taxable
transactions as sales to final consumers. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission
assessed a sales tax deficiency against Valgardson for its sales
of modular housing units to dealers from January 1987 through
March 1990.

On August 6, 1991, Valgardson filed its Petition for

Redetermination with the Tax Commission.

A formal hearing was

held before the Tax Commission on April 21, 1992. The Tax
Commission's decision dated June 3, 1992 denied Valgardson's
Petition and affirmed the Auditing Division's deficiency
assessment.

Valgardson filed for review of that decision in the

Utah Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court assigned the case to the

Court of Appeals on September 30, 1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Valgardson is a Utah Corporation and a licensed

general contractor with its principal place of business in
Springville, Utah.
2.

(Stipulated Facts 55 1 & 6, R. at 32-33.)

Valgardson is in the business of manufacturing

modular housing and other modular buildings.
2 f R. at 32. )

-3-

(Stipulated Facts f

3.

Modular housing units are built on an assembly line

at Valgardson's plant in Springville and transported by truck to
a building site where they are placed on a foundation or a pad.
(Stipulated Facts I 3, R. at 32.)
4.

Individual units are placed by a crane, or removed

from the truck, and "skidded" to their permanent location.

The

units are "stitched" to other units or to the foundation or pad,
and permanently attached to the foundation.

(Stipulated Facts,

ff 4 & 5, R. at 33.)
5.

For the transactions at issue, Valgardson sold its

modular housing units to dealers under a dealer agreement
prepared by Valgardson.
6.

The dealers would then sell the

their purchasers.
7.

(T. at 17-18, 29.)

(T. at 31.)

Valgardson had no contractual relationship with the

dealers' purchasers, i.e. the homeowners.
8.

ompleted home to

(T. at 32.)

Under the terms of the contract between Valgardson

and its dealers, the responsibilities of the dealers include:
building or supervising the building of the foundation (R. at
84); acquiring the appropriate building permits, licenses, and
local trucking permits (R. at 88); carrying comprehensive public
liability insurance (R. at 89); warranting all work and materials
which it performs or furnishes on Valgardson's units (R. at 92).
9.

The dealers agree to accept responsibility for the

modular units as they are removed from Valgardson's trucks by
crane.

(R. at 85.)

The dealers are also responsible for
-4-

"stitching" the modular units together.

(T. at 16, 25 and

Stipulated Facts 1 12, R. at 33.)
10.

"Stitching" is a process which is necessary before

the house is completed for the dealers' customer.

Stitching

involves installing some siding, capping the roof, affixing the
units to the foundation, and connecting the utilities, plumbing
and electricity, and performing minor interior work, i.e.
doorways, carpeting and some drywall work.
process generally takes a few days.
11.

The entire stitching

(T. at 16, 27, 79.)

The contracts between Valgardson and the dealers

stated that title passed on the housing units as they were
removed from the truck and before they were attached to the
foundation or pad.
12.

(Stipulated Facts 5 18, R. at 34.)

Upon permanent attachment of the modular housing

units to the foundation, they become part of the real property
under Utah's Sale and Use Tax Act.

(Stipulated Facts 5 22, R. at

35.)
13.

Where the contract was amended by work order or

invoice that stated that title passed only after the housing unit
was attached to the foundation or pad, the auditor determined
that it was a real property transaction.

(Stipulated Facts f 18,

R. at 34. )
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Sales tax is a transaction tax.

The transaction on

which the Auditing Division imposed tax was the transaction
between Valgardson Housing Systems and its dealers.
-5-

This

transaction is governed by a contract which states that the
transaction is complete and title passes when the dealers remove
the modular housing units from Valgardson's truck.

At this

instant, the property being transferred is tangible personal
property and is subject to tax.

The Commission's determination

that this transaction was taxable is supported by the stipulated
facts, is consistent with governing statutes, regulations and
case law.

The Commission's decision is not only reasonable, but

correct and proper, and should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER UAPA IS THE
"ABUSE OF DISCRETION" STANDARD. THUS THE TAX
COMMISSION'S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS
ITS ACTION IS FOUND TO BE UNREASONABLE.
Discussing the standard of review under UAPA, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
Under UAPA, this court reviews an agency decision which
interprets statutory law using the correction of error
standard found in section 63-46b-16(4)(d), unless the
legislature has granted the agency discretion in
interpreting and administering the statute. Agency
discretion may be either expressed or implied and, if
granted, results in review of the agency action for an
abuse of discretion under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i).
Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18
(Utah 1992) (footnotes omitted).1
1

Thus, if either express or

The Supreme Court has also stated, n[i]n many cases where
we would summarily grant an agency deference on the basis of its
expertise, it is also appropriate to grant the agency deference
on the basis of an explicit or implicit grant of discretion
contained in the governing statute." Morton Int'l, Inc. v.
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588
(Utah 1991) .
-6-

implied discretion is found, the proper standard of review is §
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) which provides:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
•

• • •

(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the
agency by statute; . . . .
The standard of review appellate courts apply under §
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) is one of "reasonableness."

The Utah Supreme

Court stated, "[i]n past cases, we have held that an agency has
abused its discretion when the agency's action, viewed in the
context of the language and purpose of the governing statute, is
unreasonable."

Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div, of the Utah

State Tax Coram'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991) (footnote
omitted).
In the case at bar, the Commission has been granted
both express and implied discretion to interpret the relevant
statutes.

Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act provides, "[t]he

administration of this chapter is vested in and shall be
exercised by the commission which may prescribe forms and rules
to conform with this chapter for the making of returns and for
the ascertainment, assessment, and collection of the taxes
imposed under this chapter."

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1987).

The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that by enacting § 59-12-118
"[t]he legislature has granted the Commission discretion in
-7-

administration of the tax code generally."

Putvin v. Utah State

Tax Comm'n, No. 920329-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Sept.. 1,
1992).
The Tax Commission has also been granted implied
discretion to interpret and apply the relevant statutes. First,
the terms of the statute at issue are broad and general.

In

Morton this Court stated, "we have held that when the operative
terms of a statute are broad and generalized, these terms
'bespeak a legislative intent to delegate their interpretation to
the responsible agency."
omitted).

Morton, 581 P.2d at 588 (citation

The issue in this case is whether the modular units

produced by Valgardson are sold as tangible personal property.
The definition of "tangible personal property" in § 59-12-102(13)
uses very broad and general terms.

The pertinent part of that

definition provides:
"Tangible personal property" means:
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and
commodities;
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and substances
which are dealt in or capable of being possessed or
exchanged;
(iv) all other physically existing articles or things,
including property severed from real estate.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13) (1987).
The legislature has used very broad and general
language to define "tangible personal property."

Thus, under the

Supreme Court's decision in Morton, the legislature has
implicitly granted the Tax Commission discretion in interpreting
and applying the statute.
-8-

Second, the Tax Commission's determination that modular
units are tangible personal property for sales tax purposes is a
policy decision which should be given deference on appeal. Again
the Morton Court has provided guidance by stating, "in the
absence of a discernible legislative intent concerning the
specific question in issue, a choice among permissible
interpretations of a statute is largely a policy determination.
The agency that has been granted authority to administer the
statute is the appropriate body to make such a determination."
Morton, 814 P.2d at 589.2
Third, the Morton Court also found an implicit grant of
agency discretion n[w]hen there is no discernible legislative
intent concerning a specific issue the legislature has, in
effect, left the issue unresolved.

In such a case, it is

appropriate to conclude that the legislature has delegated
authority to the agency to decide the issue."

Id.

The general and broad language the legislature used in
enacting §§ 59-12-102 and 103 is useful since it would be
impossible to delineate every possible item to which the sales
tax would apply.

Thus, from the language of the statute itself,

it is difficult to ascertain any legislative intent relevant to
whether a modular unit is tangible personal property.
2

Therefore,

Similarly in Nucor, the Supreme Court held that the proper
standard of review was the "abuse of discretion" standard in §
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) since the interpretation of the phrase
"purchased for resale" in § 59-12-104(28) was found to be a
"matter of policy that the legislature left to the Commission's
discretion." Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 187 Utah Adv.
Rep. 17, 19 (Utah 1992) .
-9-

applying the Morton decision to the present case indicates a
grant of implied discretion to the Tax Commission in interpreting
and applying the Sales and Use Tax Act since there is no specific
mention of modular units in the statutory definition of "tangible
personal property."
Finally, there is an implied grant of discretion to the
Tax Commission since it routinely is required to determine what
constitutes tangible personal property and has adopted an
administrative rule which defines it.
A recent Utah Court of Appeals decision, Putvin v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, No. 920329-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Sept.
1, 1992), involved the issue of whether the Petitioner was a
nonresident and thus entitled to an exemption from sales tax on
the vehicles he purchased in Utah.

The Putvin court found

several implied grants of authority which required the
"reasonableness" standard of review to apply.

The court stated,

"this court may recognize an implied grant of discretion to
interpret the statutory term "nonresident" if, as here, there is
an absence of discernible legislative history and the
determination of residency status is the "type of determination"
the Commission routinely performs."

Td.

(citation omitted).

As mentioned above, from the broad language defining
"tangible personal property" it is difficult to glean any
specific legislative intent as to whether a modular unit is
tangible personal property.

Further, the Tax Commission is

constantly required to determine what is and what is not tangible
-10-

personal property.

Thus, an implied grant of discretion from the

legislature to the Tax Commission exists under the analysis of
Putvin.
The existence of an administrative rule relevant to the
issue is also evidence of an implied grant of discretion.

The

Putvin court stated:
The Commission routinely makes, and in fact is
authorized by statute to adopt, rules defining who
qualifies as a nonresident for sales tax exemption
purposes* The Commission has clearly defined the term
"bona fide nonresident" in detailed rules. Thus, we
find the Commission has been given discretion to
determine whether a purchaser qualifies as a
nonresident for purposes of the sales tax exemption.
We, therefore, review its decision for reasonableness.
Id. at 4-5.
Similarly in the present case, the Tax Commission has
adopted Utah Admin. R. 865-26S-1 (1987-88) which defines
"tangible personal property."

Thus, there existed an implied

grant of discretion to the Tax Commission in its interpretation
and application of §§ 59-12-102-103 to the scenario presented by
Valgardson's Petition for Redetermination.
There exists both an express and implied grant of
discretion from the legislature to the Tax Commission in its
interpretation and application of the statutes relevant to this
appeal.

Therefore, this Court should review the Commission's

decision under § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) and affirm so long as the
Commission's decision is reasonable.

-11-

POINT II
VALGARDSON IS SUBJECT TO SALES TAX ON THE SALE OF
ITS MODULAR HOUSING UNITS TO DEALERS.
Valgardson manufactures modular housing units at its
plant in Springville, Utah,
network of dealers.

It sells these units through a

The sale is made pursuant to a contract.

The terms of the contract provide that title passes and the
transaction is complete before the units become real property.
(R. at 38.)
Utah's Sales and Use Tax Act provides "[t]here is
levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for
the following:

(a) retail sales of tangible personal property

made within the state; . . . ."
(1987).3

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a)

"Tangible personal property" is defined as:

(a) "Tangible personal property" means:
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce and
commodities;
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and
substances which are dealt in or capable of being
possessed or exchanged;
•

. . .

(iv) all other physically existing articles or
things, including property severed from real
estate.
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not include:
(i) real estate or any interest therein or
improvements thereon; . . . .
3

tax.

The vendor is responsible for the collection of the sales
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107 (1987) states:

(l)(a) Each vendor is responsible for the collection of
the sales or use tax imposed under this chapter,
(b) The vendor is not required to maintain a separate
account for the tax collected, but is deemed to be a
person charged with receipt, safekeeping, and transfer
of public moneys.
-12-

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13) (1987).
Valgardson sells its modular units to dealers who are
responsible for linking the units together and affixing the units
to a foundation.
purchasers.

The dealers then sell the completed home to

Valgardson argues that there is no difference

between its operations and that of a contractor who builds onsite.

(Petitioner's Brief at 11.) However, there is a big

difference in responsibility.

Valgardson's contract with its

dealers establishes its responsibility.

Under Valgardson's

dealer agreement, many of the responsibilities an on-site
contractor would have are placed on the dealers.

For example,

under the terms of the contract, the dealers are responsible for:
the building or supervision of che building of the foundation (R.
at 84); acquiring the appropriate building permits, licenses, and
local trucking permits (R. at 88); carrying comprehensive public
liability insurance (R. at 89); and warranting all work and
materials which it performs or furnishes on Valgardson's units
(R. at 92). Title passes and the dealers accept full
responsibility for the modular units as soon as they are removed
from Valgardson's trucks.

(R. at 85.)

The dealers are also

responsible for "stitching"4 the modular units together and
providing a completed home to the purchaser.

A

(T. at 16.) An on-

Stitching refers to installing some siding, capping the
roof, affixing the units to the foundation, connecting the
utilities, plumbing and electricity, and performing minor
interior work, i.e. doorways, carpeting and some dry wall work.
The entire stitching process generally takes a few days. (T. at
16, 27, 79.)
-13-

site contractor would bear these responsibilities.

However,

Valgardson has structured its contract to avoid these significant
responsibilities and their accompanying expenses.
The determinative factor in this case is the fact that
when title passes from Valgardson to its dealers the units are
not attached to the foundation and thus are tangible personal
property by definition.

Valgardson's process at its factory

involves fabricating and assembling tangible personal property
into a unit that, when combined with other units (i.e. nailed an
bolted together, the wiring and plumbing connected, trim, floor
coverings and walls seamed and finished, exterior walls and roofs
seamed, and the entire structure secured to the foundation),
becomes a part of the real property.

However, under the terms of

the contract, title passes prior to the time these processes are
completed by the dealers.

(R. at 85, Stipulation of Facts 5 17,

R. at 34.)
The Tax Commission, in finding that Valgardson was
liable for sales tax on the sale of its units to dealers,
concluded that the nature of the property at the time of the sale
is determinative as to whether a modular housing unit should be
taxed as a sale of tangible personal property.

The Tax

Commission held:
Those units do not become part of the real property
unless and until they are permanently affixed. Until
that time, the modular units remain mobile and thus do
not have the essential characteristic of being
permanently affixed which distinguishes improvements to
real property from other types of tangible personal
property.
-14-

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision. (R. at
7-8).

This reasoning is supported by an administrative rule

which provides:
A. The sales and use taxes are transaction taxes
imposed upon certain retail sales and leases of
tangible personal property, as well as upon certain
services.
B. The tax is not upon the articles sold or furnished,
but upon the transaction, . . . .
Utah Admin. R. R865-2S-1 (1987-1988).

Since the sales tax is a

tax on the transaction, it is imperative to examine the
transaction in determining whether it is subject to sales tax.
In the present case, the transaction subject to tax is between
Valgardson and its dealers.

When title and possession passes

from Valgardson to its dealers what is transferred are two halves
of a house being removed from Valgardson's truck.
of tangible personal property.

This is a sale

Valgardson focuses on what

happens after this transaction is complete.

That is a separate

transaction between the dealers and the homebuyers.

The dealers,

not Valgardson, sell the buyers a completed home.
The Utah Supreme Court was faced with a similar
situation in Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802
P.2d 715 (Utah 1990).

Tummurru was in the "business of

constructing modular buildings and wholesale and retail sales of
building materials."

Jd. at 716. A portion of the Tax

Commission's assessment of sales tax was on the transaction
between the contracting arm of Tummurru which purchased modular
units from the inventory of the corporation.

This Court found

possession and title as the determining factors by stating:
-15-

Because Tummurru took possession of the items within
the state of Utah and title passes within the state,
it became the ultimate consumer for sales tax purposes.
The fact that the items would be incorporated into real
property located out of the state does not change the
nature of Tummurru's consumer use of the items.
Id. at 719.

Similarly in the present case, when possession and

title passes from Valgardson to its dealer, the modular units are
tangible personal property since they are not affixed to real
estate.

The fact that the modular units are subsequently

attached to real property does not change the nature of the
property at the time of the transaction between Valgardson and
its dealers.
Other states addressing this same issue have taken a
similar approach.

In Adrian Housing Corp. v. Collins, 319 S.E.2d

852 (Ga. 1984), the Georgia Supreme Court faced with the
identical issue and similar facts as in the present case,
affirmed the Commissioner's assessment of a sales tax on the full
price of the units.

The petitioner in Adrian made many of the

same arguments which Valgardson does in this appeal.

The Adrian

court stated:
Adrian argues strenuously that the modular homes cannot
be tangible personal property because they are fixed to
realty. We agree that when the modules are delivered
and fixed to the foundation on the customer's lot they
may become realty. The focus here, however, is at the
time the modules are transferred from Adrian to Gillis.
At that time, the modules are half units on Gillis'
flatbed trailers waiting to be moved to a purchaser's
lot by Gillis, and are properly considered tangible
personal property.
Id. at 855.

The same result was reached in Sturtz v. Iowa Dept.

of Rev., 373 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1985), where the court held the
-16-

manufacturer of modular homes liable for sales tax on the sales
of its units to its dealer/distributer who in turn sold the units
to the final purchaser-

Other states have followed suit.5

For

example, in a June 25, 1984 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-0688 (June 25,
1984), the Illinois Department of Revenue facing similar facts
presented in this appeal ruled:
the answer to your question depends upon who permanently
affixes the modular unit to real estate. . . . if a dealer
sells a modular home to a lot owner as tangible personal
property (without permanently affixing it to real estate),
the dealer incurs Retailers' Occupation Tax liability based
upon his gross proceeds from the sale . . . . The question
as to who permanently affixed the modular home will depend
upon the contract between the parties and the circumstances.
Dealer delivery of a modular home to the site under a
contract for sale does not constitute permanent affixing to
real estate. This is true even where the dealer "sets" the
modular units on the foundation but does not permanently
affix it thereto.
See also Illinois Department of Revenue's Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-0188
(March 12, 1991) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-0625 (Oct. 18, 1989).
In a letter ruling from Massachusetts' Department of
Revenue, it was held that "the modular buildings are real
property at the time of sale by the dealer to its customers, but
tangible personal property when sold by the Company to the
dealer.

Therefore, the Company is responsible for collection of

the sales tax on its sale of the modular buildings to dealers in
Massachusetts."

Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-42 (March 27, 1985).

See

also New England Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner of Rev., 1988 Mass.
Tax Lexis 19 (August 1, 1988); In re Petition of Lake City

5

Copies of the letter rulings referred to are attached as
Appendix A.
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Manufactured Housing, Inc., 1991 N.Y. Tax Lexis 603 (November 14,
1991); and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-210 (Sept. 15, 1987) from the
Virginia Department of Taxation ("while the taxpayer is a
contractor for purposes of the modular buildings . . . which it
installs for Virginia customers, it will be considered a retailer
with respect to buildings which it sells without installation.").
These courts and commissions look at the nature of the
property at the time of the transaction, when title passes, the
contract, and the circumstances under which the manufacturers and
dealers operated in determining whether there was a sale of
tangible personal property subject to sales tax.

These were the

determining factors underlying the Tax Commission's decision.

At

the time title passes, the units are tangible personal property
since they are not yet affixed to the real estate.
Valgardson uses the same contract for both its in-state
and out-of-state sales.

(T. at 61-62.)

These out-of-state sales

were treated by Valgardson and the Auditing Division as sales of
tangible personal property.

(T. at 62.)

This resulted in a tax

advantage to Valgardson since no tax is due on interstate sales
of tangible personal property.
88).

Utah Admin. R. R865-44S-1 (1987-

Valgardson now attempts to characterize the same

transaction using the same contract as a sale of real property
for its in-state sales. Valgardson claims that it should be
treated as any other real property contractor, yet, what it
really is asking for is to be treated as a manufacturer and
retailer of tangible personal property on its out-of-state jobs
-18-

and a real property contractor on its in-state jobs.

The Utah

Supreme Court has stated, "[w]hen a taxpayer has chosen to
conduct business under particular arrangement, it cannot
disregard the consequence of that arrangement when it would
otherwise be to the taxpayer's disadvantage,"

Institutional

Laundry v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 706 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1985)
(citations omitted).

Since the contracts are the same in both

instances and describe a sale of tangible personal property,
Valgardson must accept the tax consequences under the arrangement
it does business.

Valgardson is not entitled to the best of both

worlds in this case.
Valgardson's reliance on Utah Admin. R. R865-58S-1
(1987-88) is misplaced.

A proper reading of the rule supports

the Tax Commission's position.

The pertinent language of this

rule states:
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real property
contractors and repairmen of real property is generally
subject to tax.
1. The person who converts the personal property into
real property is the consumer of the personal property
since he is the last one to own it as personal
property.
•

• • •

3. The sale of real property is not subject to the tax
nor is the labor performed on real property. For
example, the sale of a completed home or building is
not subject to the tax, but sales of materials and
supplies to contractors and subcontractors are taxable
transactions as sales to final consumers. . . .
Utah Admin. R. R865-58S-1 (1987-88).
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In this case, Valgardson sells tangible personal
property to a real property contractor, its dealers.

The dealers

are the persons who convert the tangible personal property into
real property since they are the ones responsible for permanently
attaching the units to the foundation, connecting the utilities,
completing the siding, applying the drywall, laying the carpet,
capping the roof, and turning over a completed home to the
purchaser.

Since the dealers are the parties responsible for

converting the tangible personal property into real property, the
dealers are the ultimate consumers of all the tangible personal
property they use; including the modular units purchased from
Valgardson.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Commission is specifically empowered to
interpret and apply the sales and use tax act.

In this instance,

it has made a determination that the transaction between
Valgardson and its dealers are sales of tangible personal
property, a decision which the Commission routinely makes.

In

making its decision, the Commission has relied on the fact that
at the time the title passes from Valgardson to its dealers that
the modular housing units have not been permanently attached to
real property.

The dealers, who are contractually responsible to

construct the foundation, attach the modular units thereto,
connect the utilities, and stitch the units together by adding
siding, interior sheet rock, carpeting and roofing, are, under
Utah law, the consumers of the tangible personal property used in
-20-

furnishing a real property improvement to the purchaser.
Admin. R. R865-58S-1.)

(Utah

Therefore, Valgardson is responsible to

collect tax from the dealers upon the sale of the modular housing
units.

(Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107.)

The Commission's decision

in this regard is consistent with existing statutes, rules and
case law.

When viewed in light of the record as a whole, the

Commission's decision is reasonable and should be affirmed.
DATED this

I ^**

day of October, 1992.

CLARK L. SNELSON
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the

day of October,

1992, I caused 4 copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to
be mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Andrew McCullough
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS
930 South State Street, Suite 10
Orem, Utah 84058

* ^

-21-

APPENDIX A

PRIVATE LETTER RULING 84-0688
State of Illinois
Department of Revenue
June 25, 1984
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 31, 1984, in which you
ated and made inquiry as follows:
"Please advise of the requirements to assure the tax implication on the
rchase of a modular home set up on a concrete foundation on property owned by
B purchaser is that of use tax on the seller/contractor, not retailers
rupation tax passed on to the purchaser,
"Please send a duplicate copy of this opinion to:
In Illinois, persons who sell modular homes as tangible personal property
r use or consumption do incur Retailers' Occupation Tax liability. Persons
D purchase modular homes as tangible personal property for use incur
tiplementary Use Tax liability. Construction contractors (persons who
rmanently affix tangible personal property to real estate) are deemed to be
B users of the tangible personal property which they purchase for conversion
to real estate.
Thus, the answer to your question depends upon who permanently affixes the
iular unit to real estate. If a dealer contracts with a lot owner for the
istruction of a modular home on the owner's site, the dealer is functioning
a construction contractor, is deemed to be the user and incurs Use Tax
ab:lity based on his cost price of the modular home. In this situation, the
t owner would take title to the modular home as real property and would
sur no sales tax liability by virtue of the Illinois sales tax laws.
On the other hand, if a dealer sells a modular home to a lot owner as
igible personal property (without permanently affixing it to real estate),
B dealer incurs Retailers' Occupation Tax liability based upon his gross
Dceeds from the sale and the lot owner incurs the complementary Use Tax
ability.
The question as to who permanently affixed the modular home will depend upon
B contract between the parties and the circumstances. Dealer delivery of a
iular home to the site under a contract for sale does not constitute
rmanent affixing to real estate. This is true even where the dealer "sets"
B modular units on the foundation but does not permanently affix it thereto.
DURCE: J. THOMAS JOHNSON, Director of Revenue
By: George C. Sorensen, Staff Attorney, Legal Services Bureau, Springfield
fice, Phone: (217) 782-7054

Construction Contractor
Private Letter Ruling No. 91-0188
State of Illinois
Department of Revenue
Slip Opinion
March 12, 1991
3JECT; Construction contractors pay tax to their suppliers when they purchase
5ms of tangible personal property which they will permanently affix to real
iate.
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 15, 1991.
:ter you stated:

In your

"We are requesting that you reply in written form to verify information on
fment of sales tax on modular homes received during a phone conversation
:h * * * * * in the tax division of the Illinois Department of Revenue. This
formation was said to be confirmed by her supervisor, Mr. * * * * * who
srheard the conversation.
We were told that because we are a manufacturer of modular homes, not
}ile, and that at the time materials are purchased we do not pay sales tax,
; when those materials are transferred out of our inventory, and into the
xiuct being made, this is when the sales tax needs to be determined. These
ces would be reported on a monthly basis using the form ST-1.
As a manufacturer we sell our modular homes wholesale to a retailer and we
3 responsible to pay the tax on the materials cost. When the retailer sells
> home, it is sold as a mortgage and as a mortgage the home will have a
ltract for deed, being taxed as real estate and therefore no sales tax is
Llected on the retail sale.
This is a totally different type of sale than that of a mobile home because
)ile homes are considered private property and taxed as such the retailer
st collect tax and report this transaction on form ST-556.
Therefore, in summary, when we manufacture a modular home the sales tax
the materials is reported on the ST-1.
Please confirm this letter as the correct procedure to follow in our tax
>orting."
We are a bit unclear from your letter as to the manner in which the sales of
> modular homes are structured. The manner in which the sales are made
:ects the tax consequences.
If you as the manufacturer, sell the modular home to someone who resells the
lular home (reseller) and reseller affixes that home to the real estate,
;eller in such a situation acts as a construction contractor. In such a
;e, when you purchase the materials that will be made into the modular home,
i will purchase the materials tax free for resale. When you sell home to
;eller, you will charge and collect tax on your selling price of the
le charged reseller. When reseller sells the home to the property owner and
ixes that home to realty, the price charged by reseller is not taxed. This
;ult occurs because reseller is acting as a construction contractor in this
.uation. Construction contractors pay tax to their suppliers when they
'chase items that will be permanently affixed to real estate. (See 86 111.

ain. Code 130.1940 and 130.2075, enclosed)
The only time that you would incur tax on the purchases of materials you
:orporate into the modular home would be if you as the manufacturer, also act
a construction contractor by permanently affixing the modular home to
ilty.
Also, if sell the home to a reseller who will resell the home as tangible
rsonal property, that is not affixed to real estate, no tax is due when you
LI the modular home to reseller or when you purchase materials to be
:orporated into the home. In such a situation you would give a certificate
resale to your supplier when you purchase the materials and the reseller
lid give you a certificate of resale when he purchases the home from you for
sale (See 86 111. Adm. Code 130.1410, enclosed)
L30.1410, 130.1940, and 130.2075
)URCE: Keith Staats, Staff Attorney, Legal Services Bureau, Phone: (217)
>-7054

PRIVATE LETTER RULING 89-0625
State of Illinois
Department of Revenue
Slip Opinion
October 18, 1989
This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated May 18, 1989. We regret
ie delay in responding. Your letter was amongst a pile of letters which was
.splaced by us and has only recently been discovered. In your letter, you
,ve stated and made inquiry as follows:
"Due to the conflict of information received from the Illinois Department
Revenue we are asking for a legal ruling on the type of sales tax the
ove captioned corporation is required to pay.
• * * * * constructs modular homes for sale to home owners. We are
rrently collecting and remitting state sales tax at a rate of 5%, local tax
a rate of 1% and mass transit tax at a rate of 1/4%, and county
pplementary tax at a rate of 1/4%."
In Illinois, retailers of tangible personal property incur Retailers'
cupation Tax liability based on their selling price of that tangible personal
operty at rates applicable to their Illinois locations. This is how you have
en treating the activities of * * * * *.
However, in Illinois, construction contractors are not deemed to be
tailers of tangible personal property. Construction contractors are deemed
be the users of the building materials which they take off the market as
ngible personal property by permanently affixing it to real estate,
nsequently, construction contractors incur Illinois Use Tax and local
cupation tax reimbursement liabilities based on their cost price of building
terials purchased for permanent incorporation into real estate. In short,
nstruction contractors pay tax based on their cost price of building
terials and pay the tax to their suppliers at the rates in effect at their
ppliers ' locations.
The answer to your question concerning the appropriate tax applicable to
sreinafter "* * * * *") depends upon who permanently affixes the modular unit
real estate. if * * * * * contracts with a lot owner or with a construction
rtractor for the sale of a modular unit * * * * * with simply delivering the
iular unit to the lot site, then * * * * * incurs Retailers' Occupation Tax
ability based on its selling price of the modular unit. This is the
Dcedure you have been following and, in this situation, the lot owner (or
istruction contractor) would incur the complementary Use Tax liability.
On the other hand, if * * * * * contracts with a lot owner for the
istruction of a modular unit on the owner's site, then * * * * * is
ictioning as a construction contractor, is deemed to be the user and incurs a
Les tax liability based on its cost price of the modular unit. In this
;uationf the lot owner would take title to the modular home as real
>perty and, consequently, would incur no sales tax liability.
The
>stion as to who permanently affixes the modular unit to real estate
>ends upon the contract between the parties and the circumstances. Dealer
.ivery of a modular unit to a site under a contract for sale does not
tstitute a permanent affixing to real estate. This is true even where the
tier "sets" the modular unit on the foundation but does not permanently affix
thereto.
IRCE: Archie Lawrence, Staff Attorney, Legal Services Bureau, Springfield
ice, Phone: (217) 782-7054

PRIVATE LETTER RULING 89-0063
State of Illinois
Department of Revenue
Slip Opinion
January 19, 1989
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of December 28, 1988. In
>ur
>tter you state the following:
* * * * * is a modular home manufacturer with its assembly plant located in
* * * Wisconsin. We build both single and multi-family dwellings and
.stribute them through a dealership network in your state.
At the present time it is unclear as to the correct sales/use tax that must
\ charged to our dealers. We wish to receive a written explanation stating
le correct sales tax percentage, and also the percentage of the home cost
ds tax applies to.
Construction Contractors:
A modular home dealer will be viewed as a construction contractor if he
; required to physically affirm the modular home to real estate. When a
>aler sells (with installation) a modular home so as to make it a part of the
ial estate, he is viewed as the end-user of the modular home in the form of
.ngible personal property. When he sells and installs the modular home, he is
illing a real estate improvement and real estate improvements are not subject
» sales
tax in Illinois. However, as the final person to exercise the
Ivilege of using the modular home in the form of tangible personal
operty, he incurs a Use Tax liability based on his supplier's selling price
the modular home. Please refer to 86 111. Adm. Code 130.101, 130.1940(c),
0.2075(c), 150.101, 150.201(i) and 150.801, enclosed.
Assuming that you are required to collect the 5% Illinois Use Tax, you
ould collect that tax from the dealers to whom you sell the modular homes if
ey will be acting as construction contractors. The dealers will not incur
y Illinois sales tax liabilities on their receipts from their subsequent
les of real estate improvements.
If you sell modular homes to a dealer who will resell those modular homes
the form of tangible personal property (i.e., no installation done by the
aler), you are relieved of any obligation to collect the 5% Illinois Use Tax
the dealer provides you with a valid certificate of resale. Please refer to
111. Adm. Code 130.1410, enclosed. A certificate of resale will relieve you
any obligation to collect tax, but the dealer will incur State and local
ales tax liabilities when he subsequently sells the modular homes to
nstruction contractors or other end-users.
If you have any additional questions, please feel free to contact us.
OURCE: Randall P. Bower, Staff Attorney, Legal Services Bureau, Springfield
fice, Phone: (217) 782-7054

Letter Ruling
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS - DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
1985 Mass. Tax LEXIS 49; LR 85-42
March 27, 1985
L]
("Company") is a manufacturer
>bec,
lada. The Company has applied
>artment of Revenue as a sales
.ling its buildings to dealers

of modular buildings in the province of
for registration with the Massachusetts
and use tax vendor because it anticipates
in Massachusetts. The Company will deliver

hilar buildings to the dealer, who will be responsible for securing the
lules to a foundation and rendering them weathertight and habitable for sale
customers. Transportation charges to deliver the modules will be part of
)unt charged to the dealer. You inquire as to the sales tax consequences of
i sale of the modules to the dealers.
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 64H, Section 2 imposes a five percent
es tax on all retail sales of tangible personal property unless otherwise
impted. Sales of tangible personal property for resale and sales of realty
not subject to the sales or use tax. The sales price upon which the tax is
ed is usually the total amount charged by the vendor. Section 1(14)(a) of
pter 64H states that "In determining the 'sale price', no deduction shall be
en on account of (i) the cost of property sold; (ii) the cost of materials
]
used, labor or service cost, interest charges, losses or other expenses;
i) the cost of transportation of the property prior to its sale at retail."
ever, separately-stated transportation charges for transportation of
perty
er its sale are excluded. G.L. c. 64H, @ 1(14)(c)(v).
Based on your description, the modular buildings are real property at the
e of sale by the dealer to its customers, but tangible personal property
n
i by the Company to the dealer. Therefore, the Company is responsible for
lection of the sales tax on its sale of the modular buildings to dealers
Massachusetts. The sales price upon which the tax is based is the total
ze charged less separately-stated delivery charges for transportation after
sale, (See Letter Ruling 83-68, a copy of which is enclosed).
Commissioner of Revenue

NEW ENGLAND HOMES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE
Docket Nos. 133860, 133861
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS - APPELLATE TAX BOARD
1988 Mass. Tax LEXIS 19
August 1, 1988
1]
F. Dennis Saylor, IV, Esq., for the appellant.
Thomas W. Hammond, Esq., for the appellee.
LL
Ls is an appeal under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. C.6 2C s.39, as
snded, from the refusal of the appellee to abate sales taxes assessed under
L. C.64H s.2 for the calendar years 1978 and 1979.
These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a request by the
pellant under G.L. C.58A s.13, as amended, and Rule 32 of the Rules of
ictice and Procedure of the Appellate Tax Board.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
The appellant, New England Homes, Inc., is a corporation organized under the
*s of New Hampshire with a principal place of business in Portsmouth, New
cipshire. It is engaged in the business of fabricating and constructing
)dular and "panelized" houses. During 1978 and 1979 the appellant paid
lies taxes on sales of materials it used in the construction of "panelized"
ises in Massachusetts under "crane-erect" contracts.
On October 16, 1980, the Commissioner of Revenue issued a Notice of
mention to Assess additional sales taxes in the amount of $1,677.15 plus
;erest for 1978 and $4,704,65 plus interest for 1979 on sales of
rane-erect" "panelized" [*2]
homes, based on the total amount billed under
>se contracts. The Commissioner contended that in the "crane-erect"
itracts the appellant was acting as a retailer of tangible personal property.
,hough the record does not show the assessment dates, the board assumes that
>y were made not less than thirty days after the Notices of Intention to
ess, as provided by G.L. C.62C s.26. The appellant paid the additional
.es and interest and on October 19, 1982, within two years of the assumed
essment date, filed application for abatement, which the Commissioner denied
January 17, 1984. According to the appellant's brief, the disputed taxes
e paid on November 13, 1981; for purposes of G.L. C.62C s.37, the
lications for abatement were filed within one year from that date. The
ellant filed the petitions with the Appellate Tax Board on March 15, 1984,
hin 60 days of the date of the notice of denial.
board finds that its jurisdictional requirements were met.
The appellant supplies prefabricated housing units to Massachusetts buyers
er three types of contracts:

1. Modular house contract: The appellant manufactures one or more
ree-dimensional boxes [*3]
at its plant in New Hampshire, delivers them to
e construction site, and assembles and installs them as a complete house on a
undation prepared by the buyer or the buyer's contractor;
2. Shell-erect panel contract: The appellant manufactures two-dimensional
nels for walls, partitions, and floors at its New Hampshire plant, delivers
am to the construction site, and installs them on a foundation prepared by
2 buyer or the buyer's contractor;
3. Crane-erect panel contract: The appellant manufactures two-dimensional
lels at its New Hampshire plant, delivers them to the construction side,
Loads them, and hoists them by crane to the foundation, where the buyer or
3 buyer's contractor installs them on a foundation with the assistance of the
pellant's crane operator.
In the first two types of contracts control, possession, and title of the
Its do not pass to the buyer until after the property has been affixed to the
nidation and become part of the real estate. In these circumstances the
nmissioner of Revenue considers the appellant to be a contractor, liable for
Les or use tax only on the price paid for materials used in construction,
ler the third [*4]
type of contract, however, the Commissioner contends
it control, possession, and title of the panels is transferred before the
tels have been affixed to the real estate. He maintains that at the time of
msfer the panels are still tangible personal property, that the appellant is
vendor of tangible personal property, and that the appellant is required to
.lect and pay sales tax on the price paid by the buyer for the completed
tels, including installation charges not separately stated. See letter to
\ appellant from the Chief of the Appeal and Review Bureau of the Department
Revenue, July 15, 1981 (Exhibit A). The appellant contends that it remains
•ontractor for these transactions, and not a vendor of tangible personal
•perty, because its crane operator retains control over each panel until the
er's contractor has finished spiking it into the foundation or the structure
does not release it until it has been permanently affixed to the structure
become part of the real estate.
The appellant presented its case through two witnesses: Robert Schrader, the
ager of its Panel Division, and Barry Ryan, its field superintendent. The
rd's findings
[*5]
are based on their testimony.
According to the evidence a typical house is designed by the owner with the
ellant's help. The appellant estimates the specifications and price and
es production drawings. The owner chooses the siding, the doors and
dows, and the configuration of the building. The appellant can furnish any
le the customer wants; the appellant designs and engineers the house in
ordance with the customer's selection of number of floors, number and layout
rooms, and roof structure (framed or trussed). The appellant tries to
ndardize the size of the walls but can supply other sizes. Unlike the
alar houses that the appellant offers, there are no standard models for the
nelized" houses; all of them are custom-built to the customer's
sifications. The appellant maintains no inventory of panels and does not
1 individual panels. If a customer cancels an order, the panels have only
^age value to the appellant. Blueprints, made by the engineering design
artment, are needed for the customer's approval, for communication between
customer and the manufacturing facilities, and for construction. Roof
3S engineering is done by the
[*6]
appellant. On "panelized"
ses,engineering work is required continually and is done by the resident
Lneer. To maintain control over its product, the appellant never sells
sis without shipment to the site and some participation in erection of the

use.
The price charged to the customer for the panels is determined by the
pellant's estimating department in a lump sum which covers construction in
cordance with the specifications. The customer makes a deposit before
gning the contract and is required to furnish a letter confirming the
ailability of funds to complete the contract. This is usually done through a
rtgage and in effect, the appellant serves as a subcontractor of the owner
r its portion of the total construction cost. If the customer intends to pay
cash, the appellant asks the customer to place the funds in escrow. The
ane-erect contract is signed by Mr. Schrader as manager of the panel division
d must be approved by the president. Insurance and the risk of loss of or
mage to panels in transit are the responsibility of the appellant. The risk
loss shifts to the customer when the appellant has completed the work
guired under the contract.
[*7]
"Panelized housing" is manufactured in a plant containing a series of
bles on which exterior walls and interior partitions are laid out, framed,
i sheathed, millwork (doors and windows) are installed, and siding applied,
c shipment to the site, the walls are loaded vertically on a trailer along
th partitions, gables, and the roof system. The exterior walls normally
asure seven by eight feet and are shipped with windows, doors, and siding in
ace. Interior partitions separate the rooms; in panelized construction they
not carry "mechanics" — electricity, plumbing, and heating.
Under the "shell-erect" type of contract, not at issue in this case, the
reliant delivers and erects the panels. When the appellant leaves the site,
* exterior of the building is 95 percent complete, and the interior is
nned, ready for installation of "mechanics," insulation, plaster or
>etrock, trim, cabinets, and for painting. The building is complete and
:ertight, ready for the subcontractors.
Under the "crane-erect" type of contract at issue in this appeal, the
>ellant also lays out and frames the panels in the plant, applies the
.1-work and siding, and ships the panels [*8]
to the site. The customers
* owners or owners' building contractors who have their own crews. At the
:e the appellant merely supplies a crane and operator and sets the panels in
tee; it is the owner or contractor and his crew who are responsible for
itening the panels to the rest of the structure on the foundation built by
\ owner.
Under a crane-erect contract, the buyer is responsible for obtaining a
lding permit. It appears that the foundation is also the responsibility of
' owner. Although Mr. Ryan, the appellant's field superintendent, testified
t the appellant manufactures the floor system, the evidence does not
close who is responsible for its installation. The appellant's crane
rator delivers the panels, unloads them from the trailer, and sets them in
ce with the appellant's crane. The buyer or his contractor then receives
panels and the components of the roof system and fastens them to the rest
the structure. When the panel is secured, the steel jaws which are nailed to
panel and by which the panel is attached to the crane cable are removed.
on-site crew of the buyer or his contractor is responsible for making the
Is plumb [*9] and square with the foundation. Although the panel remains
ached to the crane until secured, the board finds that control, and
refore possession, is transferred to the on-site crew when the crew takes
ponsibility for placing it in its final position and fastening it to the
t of the structure. Once a panel has been affixed to the structure by
ling it to the foundation or companion panels, it cannot be removed without
troying it. The crane operator remains at the site to take care of any

oblems such as damaged siding, twisted studs, or bowed rafters; to fill out
perwork; and to note any engineering problems for the field engineer to
place or repair. When the crane operator leaves the site, the appellant has
ovided a completed exterior and framed the interior, and may or may not have
nished the roof. If there are no finishing problems or warped timbers
quiring replacement, the building is weather-tight but not yet ready for
cupancy.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the board found that the appellant
ansferred possession of the panels to the buyer or the buyer's contractor
en it placed them on the foundation or other part of the structure [*10]
be installed by the buyer or the contractor. At this time the panels were
ill tangible personal property, and the transfer was therefore subject to the
les tax, based on the full price charged for the panels, including
stallation charges not separately stated.
OPINION
G.L. C.64H s.2 imposes an excise on "sales at retail of tangible personal
Dperty by any vendor at the rate of five per cent of the gross receipts of
B vendor from all such sales of such property . . . ." Under G.L. C.64H
1(13) a "sale at retail" is defined as "a sale of tangible personal property
r any purpose other than resale in the regular course of business." Under
[j. C.64H s.l(12) a "sale" includes "[A]ny transfer of title or possession, or
thf • . . of tangible personal property for a consideration, in any manner or
any means whatsoever."
The board found that the appellant transferred possession of the panels to
3 buyer or the buyer's contractor before they were permamently affixed to and
:ame part of the real estate. Until permanently affixed, such panels are not
arts of a house" (Brief for the Appellant, p. 6) but are tangible personal
Dperty. It is of no significance [*11]
that they are custom-designed and
3tom-made and have no use or value independently of the particular house for
Lch they were designed and manufactured. The panels are not, as the
reliant suggests on page 6 of its brief, "transformed into 'personal
>perty' depending upon who affixes them to the foundation." If transfer of
ssession or title takes place before they are affixed to the structure, they
> sold as personal property.
Under the sales tax statute, transfer of title is not a prerequisite to
:ation if possession has been transferred. Under the applicable provision of
> Uniform Commercial Code, G.L. c.106 s.2-401, however,
(2) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time
I place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the
'sical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest
I even though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or
lCc

•

•

•

•

i board finds that under this provision title to each panel passed from the
reliant to the buyer when the panel was secured and it became possible for
rs holding the panel in place to be removed.
The board's [*12]
interpretation of the sales tax statute is confirmed by
• documents attached to the Commissioner's letter stating its determination
assess the additional taxes, and cited in its pre-trial memorandum and its
ef: Emergency Regulation No. 12, "Contractors and Subcontractors,"
mulgated by the State Tax Commission on July 7, 1966, and Letter Ruling
68, " Sales Tax - Modular Homes."
The appellant contends that paragraph 4 of Emergency Regulation 12 does not

ply to its operation. It argues that one of its panels is not "a complete
it of standard equipment requiring no further fabrication" and that therefore
should not be regarded as "primarily a vendor of tangible personal
Dperty•"
Is argument overlooks the fact that paragraph 4 creates an exception to
ragraph 3, which specifies the conditions under which a contractor who
Dricates articles used "pursuant to a construction contract" will be subject
the sales or use tax when he buys them rather than when he sells them.
ier
s terms of the crane-erect contract the appellant is not using the materials
purchases "pursuant to a construction contract," but is using them to
Dricate a component to be incorporated [*13]
in the structure by the owner
his contractor. Whether a panel is "a complete unit of standard equipment"
not, it is tangible personal property until installed and affixed to the
il
:ate.
Similarly, the appellant's reliance on Sales Tax Information Letter No. 5,
>ued in April 1966 and stating that a contractor who builds a swimming pool
:o the ground pays a sales tax to the building materials wholesaler, rather
in collecting one from his customer, overlooks the distinction between a
itractor who himself builds a swimming pool into the ground and the
>ellant,
> furnishes panels to be affixed by the owner or another contractor.
A Memo dated September 1, 1967, written by the Chief of the Sales Tax Bureau
i approved by the Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, specifically
lresses the sales tax treatment of "Prefabricated or Precut Buildings." The
'tinent parts of this Memo state that the sale of prefabricated buildings by
istered vendor is subject to the sales tax; that their purchase for use in
sachusetts is subject to the use tax; that when the contract calls for
ivery and erection, and title does not pass until the unit is erected and
4]
weather-tight, the contractor is the consumer and is subject to sales
tax based on his cost of the materials; but that a seller who renders some
istance to customers in installation is a vendor rather than a contractor
t collect and pay the sales tax on the entire amount charged to the
tomer,
luding installation charges not separately stated.
The board found that the appellant was a seller of prefabricated or precut
erials assisting customers in installation and was therefore a vendor,
her
n a contractor, under the terms of the Department's Memo of September 1,
7. Although the appellant's crane operator assisted in the installation of
panels, it was the buyer or his contractor who were primarily responsible
the installation. Contrary to what it seems to think, the appellant was
led upon to prove that a home was weather-tight, but only that the panels

:e part of the real estate at the time of transfer. This it has failed to
The cited administrative interpretations of the sales tax statute date
:e
}licly adopted little more than a year after the enactment of the temporary
Les tax statute by St. 1966 c.14 on March 2, 1966,
[*15]
and even before
> enactment of the permanent statute by St. 1967 c.757 on November 29, 1967.
> Commissioner's position cannot be discounted as having been adopted for the
:st time in the present litigation. See Xtra, Inc. v. Commissioner of
renue, 380 Mass. 277, 282 (1980); Polaroid Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue,
! Mass. 490 (1984); General Electric Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 402
>s.
I (1988). In the board's opinion, these interpretations correctly state the
ming of the statutes as they relate to the transactions involved in this
>eal.
In support of its contention that its sales of panels are real property
LStruction activities, the appellant cites Department of Revenue v. Sterling
itom Homes, 91 Wis.2d 675, 283 N.W.2d 573 (1979). The taxpayer there, a
:er
custom-designed houses, manufactured prefabricated components to the buyer's
(Cifications, furnished the builder with detailed foundation plans, and
rdinated the builder's work in fitting the prefabricated components. The
ses and components were unique, and the taxpayer maintained no inventory of
ses or components. Under the Wisconsin statutes
[*16]
(Stats.
77.51(4) (ii) and 77.51(18)), sales of building materials, supplies, and
ipment to owners, contractors, subcontractors, or builders were deemed
ail
es; contractors and subcontractors were the consumers of tangible personal
perty used by them in real property construction activities; and sales of
gible personal property to them were subject to sales or use tax.
tractors engaged primarily in real property construction activities could
esale certificate on purchases of tangible personal property only if they
nd reason to believe that they would sell to customers for whom they did not
form real property construction activities with the property purchased.

The

consin court held that the taxpayer was engaged in real estate construction
ivities in all respects, with the single exception that it conducted its
ivities at its factory, not at the building site. Had the taxpayer
formed
functions at the site, the court said, the components would not have been
ject to tax. The court held that the legislature had not hinged the
stion
taxability on the distinction between on-site and off-site real estate
struction activities;
[*17]
the taxpayer was engaged in real estate
struction activities within the meaning of the statute, and the court
ased
Introduce a distinction that the legislature had not made. The court
ressly declined to consider whether component parts dedicated to a

rticular
rtion of a building were in effect fixtures, but relied on the specific
fislative exemption for real property construction activities. Since the
isachusetts statute provides no comparable exemption, but taxes sales of
igible personal property, however used, the board cannot avoid addressing the
istion whether the panels were tangible personal property or real estate at
\ time of sale. On this issue it found for the appellee.
The appellant also relies on Marsh v. Spradling, 537 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1976),
sre the taxpayer designed and built wooden cabinets to order in his shop and
embled and installed them in houses, usually new ones under construction,
>rice that included installation. The taxpayer paid sales taxes on his
•chases of lumber and materials. The court held that installation was an
egral part of the contract; that in the absence of contrary agreement a
dnet became [*18]
part of the real estate, and title to it passed to the
.er, when it was nailed to the house; and that the sale, when completed, was
. subject to the sales tax. This sequence of events, however, is analogous
that under the appellant's "shell-erect" contracts, which the appellee
nowledges incur no sales tax under the Massachusetts statute.
The appellant's request for a ruling of law on the point at issue was
i3d.
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:ISION
Petitioners Lake City Manufactured Housing, Inc., and Arthur E. Budzowski
i
raid R. Garity, as officers, 10068 Keystone Drive, Lake City, Pennsylvania
123 filed an exception to the determination of the Administrative Law Judge
sued on December 13, 1990 with respect to their petition for revision of
•terminations or for refund of sales and use taxes under Articles 28 and 29 of
\ Tax Law for the period September 1, 1984 through May 31, 1987. Petitioners
>eared by Joseph F. Saeli, Jr., Esq. The Division of Taxation appeared by
liam F. Collins, Esq. (Deborah J. Dwyer, Esq., of counsel).
Petitioners filed a brief in support. The Division of Taxation filed a
ter in lieu of a brief. Oral argument was not requested.
After reviewing the entire record in this matter, the Tax Appeals Tribunal
ders the following decision.
Issue
Whether petitioners have shown that they sold the homes at issue as part of
itioners' performance of a capital improvement.
Findings of Fact
ffe find the facts as determined by the Administrative Law Judge except for
iing [*2]
of fact "8" which has been modified. The Administrative Law
je's findings of fact and the modified finding of fact are set forth below.
)n June 2, 1988, following an audit, the Division of Taxation (hereinafter
"Division") issued to petitioner Lake City Manufactured Housing, Inc.

•Lake
.ty") a Notice of Determination and Demand for Payment of Sales and Use Taxes
le which assessed $ 104,629.40 in tax due, plus minimum interest, for the
>riod September 1, 1984 through May 31, 1987.
Also on June 2, 1988, the
.vision issued to petitioners Arthur E. Budzowski
id Gerald R. Garity, as officers of Lake City Manufactured Housing, Inc.,
)tices of determination and demands for payment of sales and use taxes due
dch assessed identical amounts of tax and interest as the notice issued to
ike City.
The status of petitioners Budzowski and Garity as persons responsible to
dlect tax on behalf of Lake City is not at issue herein.
Petitioner Lake City Manufactured Housing, Inc. nl has been in the business
manufacturing modular, or manufactured, homes since 1973. Petitioner's
nufacturing facility is located in Lake City, Pennsylvania.
nl All references to "petitioner" shall refer to the corporate petitioner
less otherwise indicated. [*3]
The modular homes which are the subject of this matter were all manufactured
Lake City at its Lake City, Pennsylvania facility. The raw materials from
ich these modular homes were built, such as lumber, plywood, roofing,
ywall,
ndows and siding, were all purchased from sources outside of New York. All
ese raw materials were stored at Lake City's factory, and no materials were
ored in New York State. Lake City paid Pennsylvania sales or use tax on its
rchases of raw materials.
On audit, the Division reviewed invoices which detailed petitioner's sales
tf York customers. There were 85 such sales during the audit period.
titioner had been remitting sales and use tax to New York based upon an
Dunt
aal to 60% of the invoice amount of each modular home sold in New York.
titioner had charged and collected from each of its New York customers a tax
sted on the invoice as "use tax" which was based on 60% of the invoice
Dunt.
Llowing its initial review of petitioner's invoices, the Division concluded
it petitioner should have paid sales or use tax based upon 7 0% of the invoice
}unt. The Division issued to petitioner a Statement of Proposed Audit
\]
Adjustment in accordance with this conclusion, which was based upon the
vision's mistaken impression that petitioner's modular homes should be taxed
a manner consistent with the sales and use taxation of mobile homes.
:itioner subsequently tendered payment of the proposed adjustment. The
rision, however, returned petitioner's check and issued the assessment at
sue which was based upon 100% of the invoice amount of the 85 New York sales
ie by petitioner during the audit period.
The assessment, as set forth in the notice of determination, had two
lponents: a use tax component of $ 52,131.14 which was based on 100% of the
.es price of the 23 homes that the Division determined petitioner sold and

stalled, and a sales tax component of $ 52,498.26 which was based on 100% of
e invoice amount of the 62 homes with respect to which the Division
termined
at petitioner sold but did not install.
We modify finding of fact "8" to read as follows:
With respect to the use tax component, the Division conceded that the
stallation of modular homes constituted a capital improvement, but took the
sition that, in bringing the component parts of the homes into New York,
titioner [*5]
used these materials in New York and thereby triggered the
position of use tax. Since the Division concluded that petitioner had
roneously collected sales tax from its customers based upon 60% of the
voice
d remitted such tax to the Division, the Division determined that no use tax
edit was allowed with respect to such erroneously collected sales tax. n2
n2 The Administrative Law Judge's finding of fact "8" read as follows:
"With respect to the use tax component, the Division conceded that the
stallation of the modular homes constituted a capital improvement, but took
5 position that, in bringing the component parts of the homes into New York,
titioner used these materials in New York and thereby triggered the
position
the use tax. Since petitioner had collected tax from its customers based
Dn 60% of the invoice and remitted such tax to the Division, no credit was
Lowed with respect to such erroneously collected tax."
This fact was modified to clarify that the finding of fact was intended to
ite what the Division did on audit with respect to the use tax component and
5 rationale for this action.
With respect to the sales tax component of the
[*6]
assessment, the
vision concluded that 62 of petitioner's New York sales consisted of sales of
lular home sections or components without installation.

The Division took

.ition that such sales were retail sales of tangible personal property
>ject
sales tax. Petitioner's receipts in respect of the 6 2 such sales during the
it period totaled $ 1,915,273.00.

The Division determined that sales tax

these sales totaled $ 130,753.00. The Division allowed petitioner credit
8,254.74 in tax which petitioner had collected and remitted in respect of
se sales (based upon 60% of the invoice price), and determined petitioner to
liable for the difference of $ 52,498.26.
The Division's conclusion as to whether a particular modular home was sold
installed or uninstalled basis was based solely upon information contained

e invoice. Where an invoice included a charge designated "roll-on", the
vision determined that the home in question was installed by petitioner.
ere an invoice did not set forth such a "roll-on" charge, the Division
ncluded that the home in question was sold uninstalled.
At the commencement of the hearing in the instant matter,
[*7]
the
vision conceded that the use tax component of its assessment was improper,
gaining at issue, therefore, is an assessment of $ 52,498.26, plus interest,
ich results from the sales tax component of the assessment.
Also at the hearing, petitioner conceded its liability with respect to one
Le determined by the Division to be subject to sales tax.
Specifically,
titioner conceded it owed sales tax on its sale of a modular home, sold
Installed, to Cairo Homes pursuant to an invoice dated January 24, 1986.
:itioner collected and remitted $ 1,504.56 in tax on this sale, and conceded
owed an additional $ 1,065.98 with respect to this sale.
Petitioner sells most of its homes in Pennsylvania, Ohio and New York. Most
the sales remaining at issue were made through a real estate agent, or
rough a dealer whose function is similar to that of a real estate agent. In
>ry one of these cases, the customer had identified a specific piece of land
which the home was to be installed before an order was placed with Lake
;y.
The dealer or realtor accompanied the customer to the site to
:ertain
ither a modular home could be installed at the site. The dealer or realtor
]
then prepared a diagram of the customer's proposed floor plan for the
ular home. Modifications were sometimes necessary to the customer's
ginal
ign before a feasible final design could be prepared. Lake City then
pared a blueprint which was forwarded to the customer for final approval.
Petitioner's modular homes were custom built, and the company did not
ntain any inventory of standard home designs. Its customers chose such
ngs as linoleum patterns, wallpaper patterns, roofing and siding from a
lection of samples petitioner provided to its dealers.
Petitioner sent each of its customers a certificate of capital improvement
m to be signed by the customer before production began. On each of these
ms, Lake City was identified on the certificate as the contractor,
itioner obtained a certificate of capital improvement for each of the sales
oh are the subject of this proceeding. Petitioner was unable to produce
these certificates at the hearing.
Modular homes typically consist of two or four sections.

These sections are

lfactured at Lake City's factory and are shipped by truck to the
:allation
>. Petitioner made all arrangements

[*9]

for the shipping of the houses.

l the sections arrived at the site, they were unloaded from the truck either
electric jacks or a crane, and were assembled and permanently installed on a

undation. The "roll-on" crew which performed the installation work for each
the homes in questions was W. D. Construction. In every instance,
titioner
ntacted the "roll-on" crew to arrange for the installation and to advise the
staller when the sections of the house would be on-site and ready for
stallation. Since the same installer was used in each of the sales at issue,
is installer was aware of the particular manner in which petitioner's homes
ould be installed.
As noted previously, certain of petitioner's invoices listed a "roll-on"
arge representing the cost of installation work and certain of these invoices
i not list such a charge. A "roll-on" charge was listed on the customer
voice in instances where the installer had inspected the site and advised
titioner what the "roll-on" charge would be. The "roll-on" charge was not
sted on the customer invoice in those instances where either the installer
i
t inspected the site or where the conditions at the [*10]
site indicated
at additional work might be necessary for proper installation. Under such
rcumstances, since petitioner shipped the invoice along with the house, the
Dll-on" charge could not be listed on the invoice. Where the "roll-on"
arge
3 not listed on petitioner's invoice, the installer billed the dealer. The
aler, in turn, would either pay the installer (and thereby absorb the
Dll-on" charge) or pass the charge along to the customer.
The installation of a modular manufactured home on its foundation is
rmanent; a home cannot be moved once it has been installed.
Petitioner maintained insurance on each home until it was permanently
stalled on its foundation. At that point, the home was covered by the
stomer's homeowners insurance. Also at that point, title to the home passed
>m petitioner to the customer. At no point did the dealer maintain any
>urance on the home. Also, in the event a customer cancelled an order after
>duction commenced, petitioner did not have any claim against the dealer.
For purposes of granting mortgage loans, banks treated petitioner's modular
les the same as other homes. Banks established draw schedules, and any final
.1] release of funds would not be made until the home had been permanently
•tailed on its foundation and inspected by the bank.
Petitioner provided a one-year warranty on each home. Petitioner, and not
\ dealer, was responsible for performing any work under the warranty.
Opinion
The Administrative Law Judge held that retail sales of tangible personal
»perty are generally subject to sales tax, although such property may be
mpt from sales tax if it was sold by a contractor to a person for whom the
tractor is performing a capital improvement to real property, and the
gible personal property was an integral part of that capital improvement,
ther, the Administrative Law Judge determined that petitioner had failed to

monstrate that all the modular homes it sold in New York State were capital
iprovements performed by petitioner, deeming sixty-two of petitioner's sales
odular homes to be retail sales of tangible personal property and, as such,
bject to sales tax.
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge denied the
tition of petitioner and sustained the notices of determination and demands
r payment•
On exception, petitioner makes several assertions. First,
[*12]
it
gues that the Administrative Law Judge exceeded his authority by addressing
e issue of whether petitioner is entitled to a credit or refund for
roneously collected use tax. Second, it asserts that the Administrative Law
dge improperly ignored 20 NYCRR 544.3(b). n3 Finally, it contends that
titioner successfully demonstrated at the hearing that it was responsible for
1 installations of the homes and, therefore, had performed capital
provements in every instance at issue.
n3 The Administrative Law Judge framed the issue as whether petitioner
ltracted to install the homes. Petitioner asserts that the fundamental
sstion presented, pursuant to the regulation, is whether the manufacturer
Ld
5 home directly to the customer, rather than to a contractor, subcontractor,
repairman who then installed it.
In opposition, the Division makes several assertions. First, it contends
it the question of whether the Administrative Law Judge had exceeded his
;hority regarding the use tax is moot because the Division conceded that
,nt
hearing. Second, it asserts that 20 NYCRR 544.3(b) was properly ignored
:ause it does not address the situation at hand. Finally,
[*13]
it
fues
it the Administrative Law Judge properly framed the issue as whether
:itioner contracted to install the homes.
We affirm the determination of the Administrative Law Judge.
Every retail sale of tangible personal property is subject to sales tax
ess otherwise exempted or excluded from tax (Tax Law @ 1105[a]). Tangible
sonal property sold by a contractor to a person for whom it is making a
dtal improvement to real property, where the tangible personal property is
ome an integral part of the improvement, is exempt from sales tax (Tax Law @
5[a][17]). A capital improvement is defined at Tax Law @ 1101(b)(9)(i) as:
11
(i) An addition or alteration to real property which:
"(A) Substantially adds to the value of the real property, or appreciably
longs the useful life of the real property; and
"(B) Becomes part of the real property or is permanently affixed to the real
perty so that removal would cause material damage to the property or article

self; and
•'(C) Is intended to become a permanent installation.11
The fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner, as a contractor,
rformed a capital improvement on the real property of its customers [*14]
th respect to the sixty-two sales at issue. Failure to show that a capital
provement was made by petitioner results in the imposition of sales tax. To
termine if a capital improvement was made, we must look at the transaction as
occurred.
The retail sale of a

modular

home from one party to another is the sale of

igible personal property, and is therefore subject to sales tax under Tax
* @ 1105(a). To qualify for an exemption from sales tax based upon the
rformance of a capital improvement in conjunction with the sale of the
igible personal property, the applicability of the exemption must be
Eirmatively shown (Tax Law @ 1132[c]). The contractor must demonstrate that
sold the home to the customer and that it installed the home as part of the
Le (Tax Law @ 1115[a][17]) . Just because a capital improvement is ultimately
ie to property, it does not necessarily follow that an exemption from sales
c is available. The burden is on the contractor to demonstrate that it made
5 capital improvement in conjunction with the sale. If this showing is not
ie, the sale of the home is a sale of tangible personal property which is
}ject to sales tax.
Based

[*15]

L the sales of

upon this analysis, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that
modular

homes were in conjunction with the making of capital

movements by petitioner on the real property of its customers. At issue are
:ty-two

modular

homes sold by petitioner.

For these sales to qualify for

»mption from sales tax, petitioner must affirmatively demonstrate that it
; the contractor who installed the homes. Petitioner has not done this. The
.es of the homes to customers are well documented.
s installation of these homes is lacking.

However, proof regarding

In its audit, the Division relied on sales invoices to determine whether a
lular home was sold on an installed or uninstalled basis, as shown by the
isence or absence, respectively, of a roll-on charge. The sales invoices for
s sixty-two homes at issue did not include a roll-on charge. This led the
.itor and the Administrative Law Judge to conclude that the sales of those
ty-two modular homes did not qualify for an exemption from sales tax
er Tax Law @ 1115(a)(17). We agree.
Petitioner has offered no documentation to show the existence of a
tractor-subcontractor relationship with W. D. Construction,
[*16]
the
taller. Although Lake City's president, Mr. Budzowski, testified that Lake

ty was subcontracting to W. D. Construction, the Administrative Law Judge
>und this oral testimony of petitioner's president to be insufficient in the
•sence of supporting documentation. We agree with this finding.
Further, the assertion of a contractor-subcontractor relationship is
ntradicted by the fact that, with respect to the sales at issue, petitioner
s not billed for the installation and did not pay for it.
Petitioner has produced all but five of the certificates of capital
provement for the sales at issue. However, certificates of capital
provement are irrelevant to the threshold issue, i.e., whether petitioner was
e contractor that made the installation. If this showing is made, the
rtificates would then become relevant. But, since petitioner has not shown
at it was the contractor-installer, the capital improvement certificates are
mply not applicable. n4
n4 The capital improvement certificate, in accordance with Tax Law @
15(a)(17), makes it quite clear on its face that it only applies to a
ntractor making capital improvements to real property. At the top of the
rm
states "[t]o be completed by customer and given to, signed by and retained
itractor making capital improvement to the real property." Further, in bold
Lnt the form states that "THIS CERTIFICATE MAY NOT BE USED TO PURCHASE
[LDING MATERIALS OR OTHER TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX FREE" (see, Exhibit
The capital improvement form was modified in April, 1982, to make it clear
it it could not be accepted by a vendor who was not a contractor with respect
that sale (see, Matter of Neal Andrews, Ltd., Tax Appeals Tribunal, October
1988).
[*17]
For this reason, petitioner's reliance on Matter of Saf-Tee Plumbing Corp.
ly (77 AD2d 1, 432 NYS2d 409) is misplaced. Saf-Tee Plumbing addressed the
ue of whether work done by a contractor for a customer constitutes a repair
a capital improvement in regard to the good faith receipt of a certificate
ital improvement by the contractor. The issue in the present case is
ther
seller of a product which might qualify as a capital improvement has
onstrated that it installed the product and was the contractor, thereby
ggering the capital improvement exemption.
Further, petitioner's reliance on Matter of Morton Bldgs. v. Chu (126 AD2d
, 510 NYS2d 320, affd 70 NY2d 725, 519 NYS2d 643) is incorrect. Morton
gs. addressed the issue of applying a use tax to the manufacture, sale, and
ction of pre-engineered buildings in New York State using building
ponents
ufactured outside the State. The weight given to the certificates of
ital
rovement was not an issue in Morton Bldgs., as they were accepted without
russion in the undisputed facts of the case. In contrast, the weight given

the certificates of capital improvement [*18]
in the present case is an
sue. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge in determining that the
rtificates of capital construction are inconclusive. Morton Bldgs. is,
erefore, inapplicable to the case at hand.
This is not, as petitioner alleges, a matter of form over substance. Absent
ditional evidence conclusively showing that petitioner made capital
provements in conjunction with each sale of a modular home, we cannot draw
nclusions which petitioner advances. The sales of the sixty-two modular
Ties are, therefore, subject to sales tax pursuant to Tax Law @ 1105(a).
Petitioner has made several assertions on exception. First, petitioner
Lntains that the Administrative Law Judge exceeded his authority by
dressing the issue of whether petitioner is entitled to a credit or refund
r
roneously collected use tax. This is in regard to the modified fact set
rth
Dve. We believe the fact, as modified, is responsive to petitioner's
jection.
Second, petitioner states that, as a general matter, the Division of Tax
}eals is bound by the regulations set forth by the Department of Taxation and
aance and that, based upon this principle, the Administrative [*19]
Law
ige improperly ignored 20 NYCRR 544.3(b). Regarding the authority of the
rision of Tax Appeals, it is an independent entity which is specifically
;horized to rule on the validity of the regulations promulgated by the
rision (see, Tax Law @@ 2002, 2006[7]). Given this fact, petitioner's
Liance on Matter of Duflo Spray-Chemical v. Jorling (153 AD2d 244, 550 NYS2d
1), Matter of Sinclair v. Smith (97 AD2d 953, 468 NYS2d 749), and Matter of
imbers v. Coughlin (76 AD2d 980, 429 NYS2d 74) is misplaced.
The regulation in question, 20 NYCRR 544.3(b), states:
''(b) Sales of factory manufactured homes. (1) The sale of a factory
tufactured home which has not been installed on real property as a capital
>rovement is subject to the sales and compensating use taxes as the sale of
Lgible personal property. Upon a retail sale, tax is computed on the total
.es price. The '70 percent rule' described in subparagraph (a)(2)(i) of this
ition does not apply to the sale or use of a factory manufactured home.
"(2) The sale of a factory manufactured home to a contractor, subcontractor
repairman to be installed as a capital improvement by such contractor,
0J
subcontractor or repairman is subject to sales and compensating use tax
a retail sale of tangible personal property."
Petitioner interprets the regulation to mean that if a factory manufactured
e is sold directly to the customer (not a middleman) and is installed on
1
perty, it is not a sale of tangible personal property and is, therefore, not

tbject to sales tax (Petitioner's brief on exception, p. 7). In opposition,
le Division states that the regulation is not on point because it does not
Idress the factual issue here — whether petitioner sold and installed the
>mes by its employees or a subcontractor. The Division asserts that this is a
:enario not addressed in the regulation, since 20 NYCRR 544.3(b)(1) addresses
[installed sales and 20 NYCRR 544.3(b)(2) addresses sales to contractors and
.bcontractors (Division's reply letter, pp. 2-3). Both interpretations are
correct.
The critical portion of the regulation for purposes of this issue is the
rst line of 20 NYCRR 544.3(b)(1) which states, in sum, that regardless of who
e buyer is, a sale of an uninstalled factory manufactured home is subject to
les tax. Conversely, the sale of an installed [*21]
factory manufactured
me, i.e., sale of an uninstalled home where installation is a component of
e
les transaction, is not subject to sales tax.
It is possible for a buyer to purchase a factory manufactured home from the
nufacturer but to make arrangements to have it installed by another party,
titioner has failed to establish that the sales at issue were not completed
Is manner. In this scenario, the sale of the home would be subject to sales
* because the home was purchased on an uninstalled basis. Though the home
LI ultimately be installed on the real property of the buyer, thereby
istituting a capital improvement, the steps taken to reach this point do not
Lgger the exemption from sales tax because installation was secured
lependent of the sale of the home. This is a subtlety that petitioner needs
appreciate, as this subtlety is the basis of the Administrative Law Judge's
termination and our affirmation on exception.
Thus, the Administrative Law Judge did not err by not addressing regulation
NYCRR 544.3(b)(1) in his determination because this regulation does not
.er
i result here. Under the regulation, petitioner sold the homes on an
2]
uninstalled basis and is subject to tax on these sales.
To summarize, the timing and nature of the transactions which result in a
tory manufactured home being installed on the real property of a customer,
tates whether an exemption from sales tax is available. The making of a
ital improvement does not automatically allow for an exemption. Rather, the
ing of a capital improvement must be in conjunction with the sale of the
gible personal property which is integrated in the improvement. Any
crepancy in the timing or control of the transaction may result in the
vrailability of the exemption. As stated previously, petitioner has failed
Dnstrate that it was responsible for the installation of the
Issue.
Les tax

modular

homes

Absent this proof, petitioner does not qualify for an exemption from
on the transactions.

A cordinqly,

it

• ' l,,r *•'? *

*•• J U U S L I > , ai*H ULi K E I

k
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1. The exception at Lake City Manufactured Housinc. ::. ., and Arthur E.
dzowski and Gerald '" ^aritv. as officers,, is denied;
2.

The determination ,:.f : : ,- Administrative Law ;\idc- ^

3. The petition ui ijaxe
dzowski and Gerald [*23]

affirmed;

.': Manufactured Housing, Inc., and Artl mr E
r. Garity, as officers, is denied; and

4. The notices of determination and demand for payment of sales and use
xes due, as adjusted in the Administrative Law Judge's determination, are
stained.
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FORST
This will reply to your letter of July 23, 1987 seeking information on the
rrect application of the sales and use tax to the sale and installation by *
* (taxpayer), of one-unit modular buildings made o:
xginia customers

.ncrete and <?tee„ : ,

FACTS
Accordi ng to the information enclosed with your letter, the taxpayer is
tgaged in the manufacture of the above mentioned modular buildings in its
.orida factory for use as branch banks, fast food restaurants, professional
ifices, gas marts, health clinics, etc. In general, the taxpayer ships the
Lildings to its Virginia customers with fully tested plumbing, heating, and
.r
mentioning systems in place. Some buildings are also shipped with floor
.les, furnishings, bathroom fixtures, and pictures for walls already in place;
rcording to customer specifications. After shipment of the bui ldings to its
.rginia customers, the taxpayer provides installation work at the job site
Accordingly, the taxpayer seeks a ruling on the correct appXicatioiI of the
ix to the sale and installation of the modular buildings for Virginia
is tomers.
RULING
@
of the Virginia Code provides that "[a]ny person who contracts
2]
.
zo perform construction, reconstruction, installation, repair, or
ay other service with respect to real estate or fixtures thereon, and in
Dnnection therewith to furnish tangible personal property, shall be deemed i o
ive purchased such tangible personal property for use or consumption." In
idition, the statute provides that M[a]ny sale
tD
such person
lall
* deem*
* . . . to
the ultimate consumer and nc *• f - resale."
k

1US,

contractor respecting real estate is deemed to be the taxa:
Dnsumer
f all materials furnished under a contract to erect or install property that
ill become affixed to realty and does not col] ect the sales tax from his

.stomers d len p e r f o r m i n g such c o n t r a c t s .
Since t h e m o d u l a r buildings sold and installed b y t h e taxpayer become a
.rt of r e a l t y a n d a r e assessed a s real property (rather than tangible personal
'operty) for V i r g i n i a local t a x purposes , 1 conclude that t h e taxp >a} ei: ac I s as
contractor respecting real estate when I t sells and i nstalls such buildings,
>gether with any fixtures permanent! y affixed thereto, for Virgi ni a customers.
:cordingly, the taxpayer will be subject to the tax 01 1 any materials, [*3]
[uipment, etc., used to construct buildings for Virginia customers, subject to
nonrefundable credit for any tax paid on such materials, equipment, etc., in
le state in which they were purchased. In addition, the taxpayer will not
>ed to collect the sales tax from its Virginia customers. For example, if the
ixpayer pays Florida sales tax on its purchases of materials used in the
Lbrication of the modular buildings, the taxpayer may claim a credit against
.rginia's use tax to the extent of such Florida sales tax prevl ously paid, i n
1 amount not to exceed the amount of the Virginia tax.
However, while the taxpayer is a contractor for purposes of the modular
lildings, (and fixtures attached thereto), which it installs for Virginia
istomers, it will be considered a retailer with respect to buildings which "\
>lls without installation. Accordingly, the taxpayer would be required to
)llect the tar ^ "hKo total sales price of any modular bui 1 ding which it sells
) a Virginia customer for its own i nstallation or to a Virginia contractor for
istallation for a customer. In addition, the taxpayer will be considered a
rtailer with respect to any other items of tangible personal [*4]
property
lich it provides to its Virginia customers in connection with its installation
I the modular buildings, but which do not become permanently affixed to the
lildings, such as wall pictures, furniture, and similar items.
For your further information, I have enclosed copies of two rulings issued
{ the department, dated April 3, 1985 and April 21, 1987, in closely related
ases, together with applicable sales and use tax regulation sections. I hope
lat all of the foregoing has responded to your questions, but let me know if
DU have any further questions,
W H. Forst, Tax Commissioner

